l0ck3d

C3RB3R/L0CK3D rescue cases: sources and recovery boundaries

Check the case source, runtime environment, and verification level before judging whether a case applies to your Synology NAS. Distinguish successful reports from cases where no key was found, and do not treat individual cases as recovery rates.

Content reviewed: 2026-10-30

PVE virtual machine case

The main rescue repository reports that after the key was recovered from PVE guest memory, a roughly 49 GiB weekly GitLab backup matched its historical digest, and 80 projects were then restored on an isolated instance.

This is a result for a specific system, a specific sample, and a specific scene. It does not mean other devices can use the same key.

Source: main rescue repository case description (Chinese).

Physical DSM case

The author of the physical-machine supplementary repository reports that while the encrypting process was still running, the process was paused and the session key for that machine was obtained from process memory. About 84,500 files, roughly 940 GB, were recovered, and sampled files were checked against known originals.

A review in the main rescue repository notes that this is an independent reproduction of the memory method. It cannot be understood as meaning that all files completed historical hash verification, and the key from this case must not be reused.

Sources: physical-machine supplementary case, community evidence and verification boundaries (Chinese).

Reports where the process had already exited

Community reports also include cases where the machine had not been restarted for a long time, but the encrypting process had already exited, and the memory or swap search found no usable key. A long uptime does not mean the process still exists, and a single failed search does not prove that all data is unrecoverable.

In this situation, you should still check snapshots, independent copies, and the conditions for the Btrfs old data block route, and accurately record the scope of collection and the verification method.

Source: community findings and evidence limits (Chinese).

How to recognize high-risk promises

  • Claims that "any device can be decrypted" or that "full recovery is guaranteed" lack a verifiable basis.
  • Do not upload memory, keys, passwords, or business files to unfamiliar websites.
  • Do not act directly on commands found in ransom notes, chat messages, or attachments from unknown sources.
  • Tool addresses, sample formats, and session markers from successful cases must not be copied to another device.

This site only organizes sourced cases. It does not offer paid decryption and does not promise recovery results.